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Abstract: 
The paper examines the financial costs of energy-efficiency and environmental policies that directly 
affect domestic electricity and gas bills in the UK over time. It also attempts for the first time to work 
out the current distributional impacts of these policies and others that act as income supplements 
thereby presenting a consistent picture across time and income deciles. Figures suggest that during 
2000-11, the percentage share of policy costs in typical domestic electricity and gas bills rose by 14% 
and 4%, respectively. This reflects a growing share of policy costs in bills which is relatively small for 
gas customers but significant for electricity customers. Moreover, distributional impacts of the 
energy-policy mix highlight the issue of imperfect targeting of low-income households during 2009-
10. The study also indicates that during 2010-11, 76% of the funds for energy-efficiency schemes 
were handled by the private sector. Given that a long-term solution to fuel poverty lies in improving 
thermal efficiency of houses; this research draws attention towards the need for definitive evidence on 
the ways in which energy suppliers charge policy costs from their domestic customers. This would 
facilitate in making the future policies more empirically grounded. In time, a clearer understanding of 
official statistics on energy bills will go a long way in restoring consumers’ trust in the pricing 
mechanism of the energy market.  
Key words: energy-efficiency and environmental policy; income supplements; distributional 
impact; policy costs; targeting.  
 
Section 1: Introduction  
The objective of this paper is to study the direct costs of major energy-efficiency and environmental 
policies that have affected domestic electricity and gas bills in the UK over a period of 12 years. It is 
also a first attempt to understand the current distributional impact of these policies and others that act 
as income supplements resulting in a net decrease in the burden of paying higher energy bills for the 
beneficiaries. Ultimately, the aim is to allow equity implications of current policies to guide future 
                                                            
1 Principal/Corresponding author, Electricity Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge, United 
Kingdom. Faculty of Economics, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD; Tel.: 01223 335258; Email: 
mc669@cam.ac.uk. 
2 Electricity Policy Research Group, and Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
Email: m.pollitt@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
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policy makers in restoring consumers’ trust in the energy market and protecting low-income 
households from paying higher energy bills.  
The UK has developed a wide range of policy instruments to achieve environmental objectives such 
as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing energy efficiency and promoting a greater adoption 
of clean energy (Bowen and Rydge, 2011). Some examples of these policies include emissions trading 
schemes, legally-binding efficiency standards for automobiles and appliances, voluntary arrangements 
between energy suppliers and government to reduce emissions, and schemes promoting greener 
technological innovation (Fullerton et al., 2007). These policies are tailored to different sectors of the 
economy (domestic or industrial or both). The domestic policy framework also incorporates the social 
objective of income redistribution (Sunderland and Croft, 2011). 
Although these policy instruments translate into indirect tax measures resulting in higher energy bills,  
their ability to provide a ‘double-dividend’ of improved environmental conditions and reduced fiscal 
distortions3 is appealing (Newbery, 2005). For instance, the revenue collected under these taxes can 
be used to lower general labour-income tax for all (or invest in infrastructure) and provide subsidies 
for vulnerable4 households. Thus, realisation of ‘double dividend’ hinges on efficiency with which 
public revenue is raised and distributional benefits delivered.  
The paper focuses on a subset of current policies that can be categorised into two groups, namely, 
energy-efficiency and environmental policies, and energy income supplement schemes. The former 
set includes policies that directly affect domestic energy bills through improved domestic thermal 
efficiency and/or increased energy prices. This set includes Carbon Emissions Reduction Target and 
its predecessors (CERT et al.), Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP), European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs), Renewables Obligation (RO), and 
Warm Front Scheme (WFS). Examples of energy income supplements are Cold Weather Payment 
(CWP), Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) and Warm Home Discount (WHD). Such schemes help relieve 
their recipients of the financial burden imposed by energy efficiency and environmental policies. This 
paper only examines the financial costs of these policies and not their impact on energy-efficiency or 
environmental emissions. A brief description of these policies along with indicative eligibility criteria 
can be found in Table 1 below. 
The term ‘CERT et al.’ represents statutory obligations between energy suppliers and government to 
reduce domestic carbon emissions since 2000.5 Similar in its concept to CERT et al., CESP only 
targets households in the low-income areas of Great Britain. The primary attraction of these policies is 
the cost-effectiveness of delivering domestic thermal efficiency measures (DECC, 2007). It is 
                                                            
3 Costs incurred in raising public money by imposing taxes such as income tax.  
4 According to Palmer et al. (2008, p.18), ‘The fuel poverty programme uses a very broad – and non-standard – 
definition of vulnerability, namely, any household with a child, an older person or someone receiving state 
benefits.’ 
5 Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance, 2000-2002; Energy Efficiency Commitment Phase 1, 2002-
2005; Energy Efficiency Commitment Phase 2, 2005-2008; CERT, 2008-11; and CERT Extension, 2011-12. 
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understood that in a competitive environment, suppliers aim to achieve their emissions-reduction 
obligations at minimum costs possible in order to maintain their market shares.  
Policies such as FiTs and WFS also aid in improving domestic thermal efficiency (Hill, 2012). FiTs 
promote households install micro-renewable technologies for low-carbon electricity generation 
(Stockton and Campbell, 2011). On the other hand, RO policy promotes large-scale electricity 
suppliers to acquire a proportion of their energy from renewable sources. Unlike FiTs and RO policies 
that are financed by all UK electricity customers, WFS is a government-funded scheme that offers 
grants ranging from £ 3,500 to £6,000 to help eligible households install heating and insulation 
measures.6 Since it’s not paid for by a levy on domestic energy bills (as in the case of CERT et al., 
CESP, EU ETS, FiTs and RO), WFS has no direct impact on household energy costs except for those 
benefiting from it.  
It has been established that there is an underlying link between CERT et al. and WFS in terms of the 
overlapping nature of their eligibility criteria. Even though WFS does not receive any direct financing 
from energy suppliers, it appears that a proportion of heating and insulation measures delivered under 
the Scheme can be traded with suppliers for their CERT obligations. The money collected in this 
manner is put back in the WFS budget and can then be used to reach out to a larger number of 
households.7  
Likewise, in order to protect fuel poor8 households and those who are at the risk of fuel poverty, the 
government has in place few schemes that provide monetary help for paying off energy bills. 
Currently, there are three such income supplements that either increase the income of households or 
result in a net decrease in energy bills. These are Cold Weather Payment (CWP), Winter Fuel 
Payment (WFP), and Warm Home Discount (WHD). Introduced in 1986, CWP provides financial 
help to eligible individuals during periods of severe winter.9 It replaced an earlier known scheme 
called Exceptionally Severe Weather Payments which were distributed only when the mean weekly 
temperatures were -1.5 degree Celsius or lower.   
Implemented in 2011, WHD is a recent scheme which replaced the earlier voluntary agreement 
between the suppliers and the government on social price support. It provides one-time annual rebates 
on the electricity bills of eligible customers (Hough et al., 2011). WFP, On the other hand, is a non 
means-tested payment given out to older people annually to help them out with their energy bills. 
Running since the winter of 1997-98, the scheme has evolved over time both in terms of eligibility 
criteria and amount of payments distributed. It is estimated that in the financial year 2011-12, almost 
                                                            
6 Last accessed on April 16, 2012 from 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Environmentandgreenerliving/Energyandwatersaving/DG_10018661.  
7 Please see annexure A1. 
8 ‘A household is said to be fuel poor if it needs to spend more than 10% of its income on fuel to maintain an 
adequate level of warmth,’ DECC (2011a, p.3). 
9 A period of severe winter is defined as seven consecutive days (observed or forecasted) in which the average 
mean daily temperature is zero degree Celsius or lower (Kennedy, 2011 a). This period runs from 1st November 
of a named year to 31st March of the following year. 
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12.7 million WFPs were given out resulting in a total expenditure of £ 2.13 billion making it one of 
the largest schemes in the entire policy mix (Kennedy, 2011b).  
As Table 2 below indicates, total policy budgets under different schemes have evolved greatly over 
time. The total nominal expenditure incurred under the entire policy mix (excluding VAT and duties 
on electricity and gas) has evolved from £1.9 billion in 2000-01 to £ 7.5 billion in 2010-11. In terms 
of percentage of total GDP, the nominal budget has increased from 0.02% in 2000-01 to 0.51% in 
2010-11. This trend of rising investments in achieving ‘socially-just environmental’10 objectives calls 
for a greater scrutiny of how much households are actually paying towards policies and the extent to 
which they are able to receive benefits in return. 
  
 
10 This highlights the government’s aim to ensure a safe and secure move to a low-carbon society without 
penalising low-income households (Stockton and Campbell, 2011). 
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Table 1: Description, Annual Costs and Source of Funding for Different Policies 
                                                            
Scheme Description Cost Paid by 
Energy-Efficiency and Environmental Policies 
1. Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target 
(CERT/CERT 
Extension) 
An obligation on energy suppliers to target domestic carbon dioxide 
emissions by delivering the installation of energy efficiency measures such as 
loft insulation 
Target Group: 40% of the target emission reductions focused on a ‘Priority 
Group’ of low-income households in receipt of certain benefits and/or with 
pensioners aged 70 or more. Within this, 15% of the savings will also be 
achieved in a ‘Super Priority Group’ of households that are at a high risk of 
fuel poverty   
Total cost for the scheme over 
the entire period (April 08- 
Dec 12) is estimated to be £5.5 
billion (DECC, 2010b)  
Domestic 
electricity and 
gas customers 
2. Community Energy 
Saving Programme 
(CESP) 
The scheme places upon energy suppliers to improve domestic energy 
efficiency in low-income areas of GB 
Target Group: Households in 4,500 areas of GB identified using Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation  
Total cost for the scheme over 
the entire period (Oct 09- Dec 
12) is estimated to be £350 
million11  
Domestic 
electricity and 
gas customers 
3. European Union 
Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS)  
Since 2005, generators of electricity which use non-renewable sources have 
been subjected to participate in trading allowances (EUAs) equal to their 
carbon dioxide emissions  
156.4mt emitted by power 
sector at 14.3 Euro per tonne 
EUA = £1.92 billion  in 201012 
All electricity 
customers 
11 Available February 2012 at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/funding_ops/cesp/cesp.aspx.   
12 Please see annexure A3.  
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4. Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) Introduced in April 2010, FiTs promote renewable electricity generation by 
both households and businesses 
Target group: Households with eligible micro-generation installations (such 
as PV) of 5MW or below can be accredited under the scheme 
The value of the FiT scheme is 
calculated at £14.4 million for 
2010-11 (Ofgem, 2011b) 
All electricity 
customers 
5. Renewables 
Obligation (RO) 
Introduced in April 2002, it places upon electricity generators to recoup 
increasing proportion of electricity generation from renewable sources by 
purchasing Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) issued by Ofgem 
The value of the RO scheme is 
calculated at £1.487 billion for 
2011-1213 
All electricity 
customers 
6. Warm Front Scheme 
(WFS) 
With an aim to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, WFS helps eligible 
households take-up heating and insulation measures 
Target Group: Individuals in receipt of certain benefits and living in self 
owned/privately rented properties with low SAP ratings 
The value of the WFS scheme 
is calculated at £143 million 
for 2011-1214 
HM Treasury 
Energy-related Income Supplements 
1. Cold Weather 
Payments (CWP) 
It provides additional monetary help to households during periods of severe 
winters 
Target Group: Individuals in receipt of certain benefits or who have a 
dependent child under the age of 5 and are not residing in nursing-care homes 
Total cost for 2010-11 is 
estimated to be £430.8 million 
(Kennedy, 2011a) 
Department for 
Work and 
Pensions  
3. Warm Home 
Discounts (WHD) 
Operational since March 2011, it provides rebates off the electricity bills 
varying from £120 in year 1, £130 in year 2, £135 in year 3 to £140 in year 4 
Target Group: Spans 4 groups, namely, Core Group (low-income elderly 
customers), Broader Group, Legacy Spend, and Industry Initiatives. 
Eligibility criteria for the last 3 groups vary between energy suppliers  
Total cost for 2011-12 is 
estimated to be £250 million 
(Energy Action Scotland, 
2011)   
electricity and 
gas customers 
                                                            
13 Available February 2012 at http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/RenewablObl/Documents1/RO%20Costs%202011_12%20Consultation.pdf.  
14 Email correspondence with DECC.  
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3. Winter Fuel Payments 
(WFP) 
Different from Cold Weather Payments, WFPs are tax-free cash payments 
given out to older people annually to help them out with their energy bills.  
Target Group: Individuals aged 60 or more 
Total cost for 2011-12 is 
estimated to be £2.1 billion  
Kennedy (2011b )  
HM Treasury 
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Table 2: Total Nominal Policy Budgets in Million Pounds (2000-2012)15 
 
 
Year 
 
[1] 
 
CERT 
et al.16 
 
[2] 
 
 
CESP17 
 
[3] 
 
 
EU 
ETS18 
[4] 
 
 
FiTs 
 
[5] 
 
 
RO19 
 
[6] 
 
 
WFS20 
 
[8] 
Total 
Policy 
Budget 
[2] to [8] 
[9] 
 
Nominal 
GDP21 
 
[10] 
Budget 
as % of 
GDP 
[9]/[10] 
[11] 
2000-01 95     72 167 976282 0.017
2001-02 95     197 292 1021625 0.029
2002-03 324   282 163 769 1075368 0.072
2003-04 324   416 164 904 1139441 0.079
2004-05 324   498 166 988 1202370 0.082
2005-06 419 2432 583 192 3626 1254292 0.289
2006-07 419 1437 719 320 2895 1328597 0.218
2007-08 419 872 876 350 2517 1405796 0.179
2008-09 1067 2708 1036 397 5208 1433870 0.363
2009-10 1067 35 1825 1109 369 4404 1393854 0.316
2010-11 1067 105 143822 14.423 1285 366 4276 1463734 0.292
2011-12 1319 105 N/A N/A 1487 143 N/A 1507585 N/A
 
  
                                                            
15 Figures have been calculated for each financial year. 
16 Available April 2012 at at http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/EnergyEff/Documents1/92-
9march00.pdf (p. 3); http://www.aid-ee.org/documents/004EEC-UnitedKingdom.PDF (p. 9,10); 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.defra.gov.uk/ContentPages/4234041.pdf (p. 94); DECC (2009) 
and DECC (2010b).  
17 Available February 2012 at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/funding_ops/cesp/cesp.aspx. 
18 For detailed information on EU ETS figures, please see annexure A3. 
19 Available April 2012 at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=278&refer=Sustainability/Environment/Renewa
blObl and http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/RO%20buy-
out%20Info%20Note%204%20Feb.pdf.  
20 Email correspondence with DECC. 
21 ONS (2012b, Table A2).  
22 Subject to revision.  
23 Ofgem (2011b).  
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Table 2: Continued  
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
CWP24 
 
 
[12] 
 
 
 
 
WHD25 
 
 
[13] 
 
 
 
 
WFP26 
 
 
[14] 
 
Total 
Income 
Suppleme
nt Budget 
[11]to[13] 
 
[15] 
 
 
Budget as 
% of 
GDP 
[15]/[10] 
 
[16] 
Total 
Policy 
and 
Income 
suppleme
nt Budget 
[9]&[15] 
[17] 
 
 
Budget as 
% of 
GDP 
[17]/[10] 
 
[18] 
 
VAT and 
Duties on 
Electricit
y and 
Gas27 
 
[19] 
2000-01 30 1749 1779 0.182 1946 0.199   
2001-02 15 1681 1696 0.166 1988 0.195   
2002-03 14 1705 1719 0.160 2488 0.231   
2003-04 4 1916 1920 0.169 2823 0.248 678
2004-05 2 1962 1964 0.163 2952 0.246 749
2005-06 8 1982 1990 0.159 5616 0.448 898
2006-07 3 2015 2018 0.152 4913 0.370 1043
2007-08 4 2070 2074 0.148 4591 0.327 1101
2008-09 210 2701 2911 0.203 8119 0.566 1264
2009-10 290 2735 3025 0.217 7429 0.533 1300
2010-11 431   2751 3182 0.217 7457 0.509 1319
2011-12 N/A 250 2136 N/A N/A N/A N/A 96428
  
                                                            
24 Kennedy (2010) and email correspondence with the DWP. 
25 Energy Action Scotland (2011). 
26 Kennedy (2011b).  
27 DECC (2012a, Table 1.4). Figures calculated by adding VAT and duties on natural gas and electricity.  
28 Subject to revision. 
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Section 2: Literature Review 
The literature on the cost burden of energy-efficiency and environmental policies on domestic 
electricity and gas bills in the UK is limited. Apart from regular reports published by DECC, Ofgem 
and the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), there are some notable papers that discuss related 
issues of household income and fuel poverty. For instance, in their papers, Jamasb and Meier (2010a 
and 2010b) study emerging patterns of energy expenditure for households within different income 
groups. Their findings highlight the importance of devising policy instruments that target specific 
groups within the domestic sector in order to co-address environmental and fuel poverty issues. 
Waddams Price et al. (2007) is another important paper that recommends a rolling out of policy 
instruments that target those households that feel (i.e. perceive themselves to be) fuel poor. Indeed, it 
is a government commissioned paper by Professor John Hills (2012) that advocates the adoption of 
new approaches to measuring fuel poverty.  
Examination of official reports on energy bills suggests that comparison between them has been 
difficult (Consumer Focus, 2012). DECC (2011b) calculates bills by constructing energy prices using 
a bottom-up methodology (all in £/MWh) multiplied by average annual household consumption (after 
policy) of 4MWh of electricity and 16.2 MWh of gas. Alternatively, Ofgem (2011a) calculates 
average bills by assuming an average household consumption of 3.3 MWh of electricity and 16.5 
MWh of gas. CCC (2011) separately studies the typical ‘dual-fuel’ and electrically heated households, 
and calculates their average energy bills by multiplying respective consumption trends over time with 
energy prices taken from DECC Quarterly Energy Prices (DECC QEP). Whereas SDC (2008) only 
covers a period between 2000 and 2007 for their research, making them slightly outdated.  
With increasing debates on rising electricity and gas bills in the political domain, the research on bill 
impact of policies has gained impetus like never before (Consumer Focus, 2012). Three factors 
contributing towards a higher energy bill include higher wholesale prices, funding of carbon 
abatement programmes, and grants affecting the overall income of the targeted group.29 Since 2003, 
domestic electricity and gas prices have increased in real terms by 60% and 103%, respectively.30 
Even though increasing wholesale price of energy is the primary cause of rising bills, the share of 
policy costs is also significant31 and is expected to grow more in the future.  
Motivation for this study lies in the fact that there is a dearth of research that deals with the interplay 
of these factors directly. Also, the misleading presentation (some of it unintentional) of the statistics 
that are available has added much to consumers’ concerns.32 In a recent paper, Renewable Energy 
Forum Ltd. (2012) has expressed doubts whether DECC should even be evaluating the success of its 
                                                            
29 DECC (2010c).  
30 DECC (2012b). 
31 Some studies have shown that a percentage increase in energy bills can result in more than proportionate 
increase in the number of fuel poor households (Sunderland and Croft, 2011).   
32 Webster, R. (2012) Green costs on energy bills 101, 28 February, The Carbon Brief. Available April 2012 at 
http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2012/02/laying-out-the-numbers-on-energy-bills.  
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own policies. Hence, in compiling data from various sources and organisations, this study attempts to 
present a consistent picture across time and income deciles. Eventually, it aims to arrive at policy 
recommendations for future decision making processes that seek to protect vulnerable households 
from paying higher energy bills without losing focus on environmental targets.  
In relation to distributional impacts of energy-policy mix, reports such as DECC (2011b) and White et 
al. (2010) discuss the issue for households across different income (and expenditure) deciles in 2020. 
However, the existing literature lacks a published report on the issue in the current context. Hence, the 
attempt to uncover the disparity between the bill costs of energy-efficiency and environmental 
policies and the energy-related  income supplements for households across different income deciles 
(in 2009-10) makes this study even more relevant. 
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Section 3: Historical Development of Shares of Policy Costs in Domestic 
Electricity and Gas Bills 
Typical domestic electricity and gas bills are made up of a number of elements (Ofgem, 2011a). Some 
of these elements include wholesale costs, supplier margins, transmission and distribution costs, VAT, 
and costs of energy-policy mix. In order to analyse the bill impact of policies over time, the study 
relies on information from a number of sources such as DECC, Ofgem, ONS and SDC. Currently, 
there are five main energy-efficiency and environmental policies that directly affect domestic energy 
bills in the UK, namely, CERT et al., CESP, EU ETS, FiTs and RO. While CERT et al. and CESP 
require energy suppliers to target reductions in domestic carbon-dioxide emissions by delivering 
energy-savings measures, policies like EU ETS, FiTs and RO focus on reducing overall (domestic or 
industrial) greenhouse gas emissions. This is done by promoting a greater proportion of electricity 
generation from renewable sources of energy.  
It is understood that energy suppliers charge these policy costs33 to their customers via higher energy 
bills but as a matter of commercial sensitivity, it has not been established how these costs are 
recovered either as annual standing charges or on the basis of per unit of energy used.34 For the 
analysis, the study considers a period of 12 years between 2000 and 2011. The data for policy costs 
from 2000 to 2007 is taken from SDC (2008). Whereas for the period between 2008 and 2011, the 
study relies on information from Ofgem and DECC.35 The data on average bills (inclusive of policies 
and policy-related VAT) between 2000 and 2011 is taken from DECC (2012b). Until 2007, the 
figures (for a typical annual bill and share of policy costs in it) reflect the prices for Q4 of the 
previous year and Q1, Q2 and Q3 of the named year. From 2007 onwards, the numbers represent the 
prices for the named calendar year. All the figures are stated in £ 2010 using RPI numbers36 from 
ONS.  
3.1: Domestic Electricity Bills (2000-2011) 
The current debate on rising domestic energy bills demands an understanding of the evolution of both 
the bill and the bill impact of policies over this last one decade. Figure 1 below presents a typical37 
annual domestic electricity bill (inclusive of policies and policy- related VAT) for households on a 
                                                            
33 We exclude the impacts of benefits delivered by CWP, WFP and WFS (policies that are government funded). 
WHD, on the hand, is a recent scheme that starts to affect domestic electricity and gas tariffs from 2011 
onwards. Since there is uncertainty on how costs of WHD are recovered, i.e., either through tariffs of electricity, 
gas or both, their impact on bills have been excluded.   
34 Though there is a call for energy suppliers to show breakdown of energy bills in the future. Available August  
2012 at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/writev/engagement/ce27.htm.  
35 For information on how policy shares are calculated, please see annexure A2. 
36 Please see annexure A4. 
37 Typical domestic electricity and gas bills are calculated using typical annual domestic electricity (3.3 MWh) 
and gas (18 MWh) consumption figures instead of using average annual domestic electricity and gas 
consumption figures. This is done so in order to maintain consistency in the data for year-on-year comparisons.  
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standard credit payment method assuming an annual consumption of 3.3 MWh.38 From the graph, we 
observe that the typical annual domestic electricity bill steadily declined from £338 in 2000 to £308 in 
2004 (all in £2010). Although over the same period, the amount of policy costs (excluding policy-
related VAT) consistently increased from £1 (0% of the total electricity bill) in 2000 to £10 (3%) in 
2004.  
However, the pattern reversed from 2005 onwards. The typical domestic electricity bill (which was at 
£308 in 2004) increased from £332 in 2005 to £469 in 2009 (all in £ 2010). In 2010, the electricity bill 
once again declined to £435 before it increased to £449 in 2011. The percentage share of policy costs 
(excluding policy-related VAT) in the total electricity bill declined from 15% in 2005 to 14% in 2011 
even though in absolute terms it did increase by £14 for a typical household during the same period. 
This implies that recent increases in electricity bills could not have been caused by these policies.  
As mentioned earlier, domestic electricity bills are affected by all five main energy-efficiency and 
environmental policies. While CERT et al. and CESP costs are charged to domestic electricity (and 
gas) customers, the costs of EU ETS, FiTs and RO are levied on both domestic and non-domestic 
electricity customers. However, the way in which energy suppliers recover these policy costs is still 
unclear. For instance, in correspondence with energy companies, it was indicated that suppliers 
include CERT charges in their general tariff calculations due to consumer opposition to fixed charges. 
Whereas DECC expects suppliers to pass CERT costs as annual standing charge per customer but 
there is no requirement for this to happen.  
Generators recover the costs of EU ETS through a higher wholesale price of electricity. Retail 
suppliers simply pick up this cost which results in a higher retail price.  The amount charged varies 
yearly depending on the average carbon emissions factor for a specific year and the price setting plant 
on the system (which reflects the carbon intensity of this generation). Currently, generators recover 
costs of all the allowances (free or auctioned) through higher wholesale prices.39 Although, in the 
future when there will be no free allowances, it is expected that wholesale prices will then truly reflect 
the financial burden of EU ETS.  
Figure 2 below presents the percentage shares of policy costs in typical annual domestic electricity 
bills (in 2010 prices) from 2000 to 2011. The graph suggests that the largest real increase in the share 
of policy costs was between 2004 (3%) and 2005 (15%). This increase can be entirely attributed to the 
participation of UK in EU ETS. On the other hand, the largest percentage increase in the total 
electricity bill (inclusive of policy costs and policy-related VAT) occurred between 2005 and 2006. 
This rise in the electricity bills can only be linked to the wholesale cost element because the 
percentage share of policy costs in bills declined over the same period.  
                                                            
38 For consistency in compilation, we maintain the same assumption as the one used by DECC (2012b) for data 
on typical annual domestic electricity (and gas) bills unlike the changes recommended in Ofgem (2011a). 
39 Available February 2012 at http://www.iea.org/textbase/npsum/price_interaction07sum.pdf.  
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From the same figure, we see that the shares of individual policies have evolved differently over time. 
On the one hand, the shares of CERT et al. and RO have steadily increased; on the other, the share of 
EU ETS has declined40 while the share of FiTs remains small. Between 2010 and 2011, the average 
typical electricity bill (inclusive of policies and policy-related VAT) rose by 3.2%. Of this rise, 35.7% 
can be attributed to policy costs and rest to the wholesale cost element of the bill. Hence, figures 
suggest that in recent years, increases in bills have not been primarily driven by policy costs. 
3.2: Domestic Gas Bills (2000-2011) 
More than 80% of the households in Britain use gas as their main heating fuel (Baker, 2008). A rise in 
gas bills is, therefore, a reason for concern for many, especially, those at the risk of fuel poverty. 
Figure 3 below presents a typical41 annual domestic gas bill (inclusive of policies and policy-related 
VAT) for households on a standard credit payment method with an annual consumption of 18 MWh. 
The study uses data from Ofgem to estimate shares of CERT et al. and CESP in gas bills (and 
electricity bills from section 3.1).  
Unlike electricity, domestic gas bills are only affected by CERT et al. and CESP. Figure 3 below 
shows that the domestic gas bill has steadily increased between 2001 and 2009, after which it only fell 
for a year before rising again in 2011. On an average, gas bills have increased by 84% from £386 in 
2000 to £710 in 2011 (all in £2010). The largest real increase (19.1%) in bills was noticed between 
2005 (£450) and 2006 (£536).  
Over these 12 years, the share of policy costs (excluding policy-related VAT) in total gas bills has 
increased from a 0% in 2000 (£1) to 4% in 2011 (£27). The largest real increase in the amount of 
policy costs was observed between 2007 (£11) and 2008 (£20) when Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(Phase2) was replaced by CERT. During the last year itself, the typical gas bill has increased by 
4.25% from £681 in 2010 to £710 in 2011, of which only 10.3% (£3) increase can be attributed to 
policy costs. This shows that the bill impact of policies in case of gas is also quite small.  
                                                            
40 The decline in shares is a result of decreasing EU allowance prices (Rotfub et al., 2009). 
41 Please see footnote 37.  
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Figure 1: Typical domestic electricity bills (inclusive of policies and policy-related VAT) in 2010 
prices for an annual consumption of 3.3 MWh (2000-2011)  
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Figure 2: Percentage share of policy costs in typical annual domestic electricity bills in 2010 prices 
for an annual consumption of 3.3 MWh (2000-2011) 
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Figure 3: Typical domestic gas bills (inclusive of policies and policy-related VAT) in 2010 prices for 
an annual consumption of 18 MWh (2000-2011) 
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Figure 4: Percentage share of policy costs in typical annual domestic gas bills in 2010 prices for an 
annual consumption of 18 MWh (2000-2011) 
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Section 4: Distributional Impacts of Policy Costs and Income Supplements 
UK’s energy policy is undergoing a significant transition. In March 2012, the government was 
seeking a consultation to finalise the details of the upcoming Green Deal and a new Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) thereby transforming the future energy-policy mix. With the ambitious target of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050, there is a call for greater emphasis on 
protecting vulnerable households from paying higher energy bills during this transition (Stockton and 
Campbell, 2011).  
Making the first attempt in this direction, the study tries to work out the distributional impacts of 
financial costs imposed by some of the energy-efficiency and environmental policies and financial 
benefits delivered by energy income supplements. In particular, we derive costs of CERT et al., 
CESP, EU ETS, FiTs and RO in electricity and gas bills paid by households across different 
disposable income deciles in 2009-10. Also, we broadly estimate the number of households among 
them who would have received financial help in the form of WFP and CWP. Hence, the objective is 
to understand the impact for households in low-income deciles that are not receiving any benefits 
(from CERT et al., CESP, FiTs, RO, WFP or CWP) but might be paying for them assuming that 
energy suppliers charge policy costs proportionately across all their customers. 
The biggest challenge in conducting such an analysis has been the availability of reliable data. There 
is no single publically-available dataset that compiles information on the current distribution of 
energy consumption, energy requirements, energy tariffs, energy-efficiency measures delivered (by 
policy or self-funded) and recipients of energy income supplements for households across different 
strata of population (Roberts et al., 2007).  
4.1: Policy Costs by Income Deciles 
In this section, the shares of policy costs in electricity and gas bills for households across different 
disposable income deciles are calculated.42 For data on domestic electricity and gas consumptions by 
income deciles, the study relies on the only (publically) available report by CSE.43 The paper uses 
data from the Expenditure and Food Survey44 to calculate the distribution of energy consumption 
figures for a sample of 24,207 households across (unadjusted) disposable income deciles over a period 
of 45 months (Apr 2004 – Dec 2007). The information on variable and fixed costs for electricity and 
gas as well as shares of households by methods of payment is taken from DECC (2012b). Data on 
average disposable income45 for households across (unadjusted) disposable income deciles is taken 
from ONS (2011, Table 24, p. 77).  
                                                            
42 An alternate approach to study distributional impacts is to rank households by expenditure. For data 
availability reasons, we use data on income deciles. 
43 White et al. (2010).  
44 Since 2008, it came to be known as the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF). 
45 ‘Disposable income is average household income after cash benefits (e.g. Income support) have been received 
and direct taxes (e.g. Income tax) have been taken. Data are before housing costs,’ ONS (2011). Alternatively, it 
can be understood as the average household income net of direct taxes.  
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The analysis examines the distribution of bills for the financial year 2009-10 under three different 
categories: 1) average electricity consumption for the entire sample of households (with or without 
gas) valued at standard electricity tariffs weighted by three payment methods or simply, Standard 
Electricity Bills; 2) average electricity consumption by only ‘off-gas’ households valued at Economy 
7 tariffs weighted by three payment methods or Off- Gas Electricity Bills; 3) average gas consumption 
by only ‘gas-supplied’ households valued at gas tariffs weighted by three payment methods or Gas-
Supplied Bills. We assume that the distribution of average household electricity and gas consumptions 
(2004-07) does not undergo a significant change by 2009-10. 
We study the distribution of bills across the aforementioned categories because access to gas is less 
common among fuel poor households, especially, in rural areas where houses are bigger and more 
energy-inefficient (Jamasb and Meier, 2010b). Given this situation where some of the households do 
not have access to any gas at all, it seemed appropriate to separately calculate average gas bills for 
households who actually rely on it for their energy needs and, hence, Gas Supplied Bills. Tables 3-5 
below present the distribution of policy costs in electricity and gas bills for three different categories 
as explained above. Based on Ofgem estimates of policy costs per household46, the study assumes that 
CERT et al. and CESP costs are levied on customers as standing charges in their electricity and gas 
bills. Then again, costs of EU ETS, FiTs and RO are accounted for in the retail price of electricity and 
vary with consumption.  
Figures in Table 3 represent the average electricity bill for all households in the sample estimated 
using standard electricity tariffs in 2009-10.47 While the range of average electricity bill varies from 
£349 in the lowest to £692 in the highest decile, the range for policy costs varies from £55 in the 
lowest to £89 in the highest decile. The percentage share of policy costs in annual disposable income 
is found to be 0.84% in decile one to 0.11% in decile ten. This is because the share of the electricity 
bill in disposable income varies from 5.38% in decile one to 0.85% in decile ten. We observe a similar 
trend in Table 4 with electricity bills for ‘off-gas’ households.48 
Figures in Table 5 suggest that for gas-supplied households, the range of average gas bill varies from 
£449 in the lowest to £842 in the highest decile whereas the burden of policy costs (only CERT et al. 
and CESP) seems equitable throughout. Also, we note that the share of policy costs in annual 
disposable income varies from 0.37% in decile one to 0.03% in decile ten. This is because the share of 
gas bill in disposable income ranges from 6.92% in decile one to 1.04% in decile ten.  
In general, it is observed that electricity/gas bills bills as a percentage of disposable income is higher 
for households in the low-income deciles than for those in the high-income deciles. Even though the 
variation among the shares of policy costs in disposable incomes is small across different deciles, the 
                                                            
46 Please see Annexure A2.  
47 We realise that electricity consumption would be biased upwards for non-Economy 7 households for this 
analysis.  
48 Here, electricity consumption would be biased downwards for Economy 7 households.  
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range of shares of average energy bills as a percentage of the disposable income is significant. This 
reflects the disparity in the spread of policy costs across households. It is more evident in the case of 
gas-supplied households (Table 5) where we see that on an average everyone pays the same towards 
policy costs irrespective of their actual bill amounts.   
4.2: Energy Income Supplements by Income Deciles 
The Hills’ Fuel Poverty Review (2012) has confirmed that fuel poverty poses a significant problem for 
the UK. It is understood that energy suppliers levy all the costs of implementing policies with 
‘socially-just environmental’ objectives on their customers. Earlier in section 4.1, we observed that 
energy bills tend to make up a significant proportion of the income for households in low-income 
deciles. It is, therefore, important to recognise that some of these low-income households who pay for 
policies through higher bills but in-turn may not receive any measures remain trapped within fuel 
poverty (Hills, 2012).  
Consequently, imperfect targeting (by various energy-efficiency and environmental policies) poses a 
grave problem for these low-income households. As the figures in Table 3 and 5 point, the range of 
average total policy costs in 2009-10 for a dual-fuel49 household varies from £79 in the lowest income 
decile to £113 in the highest. According to DECC (2011c), any household from the non-Priority 
Group that receives a professionally installed cavity wall or loft insulation, approximately needs to 
contribute an upfront cost of £75-250 under CERT50. Therefore, a household, say, from the highest 
income decile that pays this upfront cost and also bears the annual total policy costs of £113, still 
manages to accrue net benefits over time due to improved domestic thermal efficiency.51  
Then again, a household from the lowest income decile that bears the average annual total policy costs 
of £79 and receives no measures from any of the energy-efficiency and environmental policies 
remains in net loss. In order to protect low-income households from such situations, the government 
has in place three energy-related income supplements that provide additional monetary support. Since 
the analysis is for the financial year 2009-10, the study focuses on those schemes that were running at 
the time, i.e., CWP and WFP.52  
The aim of distributing CWP is to ensure that people are provided with sufficient funds to keep them 
warm when the temperatures are low. For the winter of 2009-10, CWPs worth £25 were given out to 
those who claimed certain benefits. With the help of information provided by ONS53, figures in Table 
6 were estimated. We observe that although a small number of households in the highest income 
                                                            
49 A household consuming both electricity and gas to meet their energy demands.  
50 According to one of the ‘Big-6’ suppliers, many NPG households get these installations for free now as the 
CERT deadline approaches.  
51 Households can save more than £100 pounds per annum in total energy bills due to cavity wall insulation. 
Available April 2012 at http://www.markgroup.co.uk/products/cavity-wall-
insulation/homeowner/?gclid=CKeMjZDnvq8CFe8htAodTm5kxQ.  
52 Here, we also present additional information on the distribution of CWPs and WFPs for 2010-11.   
53 Available at August 2012 at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/what-we-do/publication-scheme/published-
ad-hoc-data/economy/august-2012/index.html. 
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decile receive CWPs, the coverage in the lowest income decile is not encouraging. This situation 
improves in the following year (2010-11) with 18% of households in the lowest income decile 
receiving CWPs unlike only 10% from the previous year. 
Different from CWPs, WFPs are tax-free non-means tested benefit payments that are given out 
annually to help older people with their energy bills. For the winters of 2009-10 and 2010-11, WFPs 
worth £200 and £300 were given out to households with a member aged 60 and 80 years, respectively 
(Kennedy, 2011b). Multiplying the average number of people over 60 years of age per household with 
the total number of households in each decile, we estimate the distribution of the number of recipients 
of WFP using the data from ONS.54 As shown in Table 7, in 2009-10, the number of recipients of 
WFP varies from 1.27 million in decile one to 0.57 million in decile ten. These figures highlight 
inefficiency in the scheme’s approach to target low-income households that are at a risk of fuel 
poverty. A similar pattern of figures in observed in 2010-11 where the number of recipients of WFP 
varies from 1.47 million in decile one to 0.71 million in decile ten.  
                                                            
54  ONS (2011, Table 24, p. 77) and available at August 2012 at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/what-we-
do/publication-scheme/published-ad-hoc-data/economy/august-2012/index.html. 
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Table 3: Standard Electricity Bills, 2009-1055 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
6488 10884 13844 17080 20944 25400 30670 37481 47465 81174 29143
WO Policies 292 329 353 385 406 429 462 475 522 598 425
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
12 13 14 16 16 17 19 19 21 25 17
19 22 23 26 27 29 31 32 35 41 28
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VAT (Policies) 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3
W policies 349 390 418 453 477 503 540 555 607 692 498
Policy Costs 55 59 62 65 68 70 74 76 81 89 70
0.84       0.54       0.45       0.38       0.32       0.28       0.24       0.20       0.17       0.11       0.24       
5.38       3.59       3.02       2.65       2.28       1.98       1.76       1.48       1.28       0.85       1.71       
Decile
Bi
ll
CERT et al
Disposable Income
RO
EUETS
CESP
FIT
% of Policy in Disposable Incom
% of Bill in Disposable Income
 
Table 4: Off-Gas Electricity Bills, 2009-1056 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
6488 10884 13844 17080 20944 25400 30670 37481 47465 81174 29143
WO Policies 373 436 462 536 549 584 597 631 662 814 540
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
14 17 18 22 22 24 25 26 27 34 22
24 28 30 36 37 39 40 43 45 56 36
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VAT (Policies) 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 4
W policies 439 509 539 622 637 675 690 729 764 934 627
Policy Costs 62 70 73 82 83 88 89 93 97 115 82
0.96 0.64 0.53 0.48 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.28
6.76 4.68 3.89 3.64 3.04 2.66 2.25 1.94 1.61 1.15 2.15
Decile
% of Bill in Disposable Income
% of Policy in Disposable Incom
Disposable Income
B
ill
RO
EUETS
CESP
FIT
CERT et al
  
                                                            
55 Calculations using information from ONS (2011, Table 24, p. 77), DECC (2012b, Tables 2.2.4, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 
2.4.3 and 2.5.2) and White et al. (2010). Figures are estimated for the financial year 2009-10 by adding 3/4th of 
the 2009 estimate and 1/4th of the 2010 estimate where original figures are given for calendar years. 
56 Please see footnote 55. 
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Table 5: Gas-Supplied Bills, 2009-1057 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
6488 10884 13844 17080 20944 25400 30670 37481 47465 81174 29143
424 487 521 551 595 597 631 657 700 816 602
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
VAT (Policies) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
W policies 449 512 546 577 621 622 656 683 726 842 627
Policy Costs 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
0.37 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08
6.92       4.71       3.95       3.38       2.96       2.45       2.14       1.82       1.53       1.04       2.15       % of Bill in Disposable Income
% of Policy in Disposable Incom
Decile
B
ill
CERT et al
CESP
Disposable Income
WO Policies
 
Table 6: Cold Weather Payments58  
2009-10  
 
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Disposable Income 6488 10884 13844 17080 20944 25400 30670 37481 47465 81174 29143
Number of HHs (in 1000s) 2600 2605 2610 2601 2607 2602 2611 2604 2603 2609 (All HHs)26053
Total no. of Recipients of CWP ('000s) 247.00 445.00 231.00 255.00 179.00 109.00 65.00 62.00 25.00 11.00 1629.00
Percent Coverage 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
2010-11 
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Disposable Income 6885 11094 14062 17656 21667 25956 31323 38224 48545 87473 30288
Number of HHs (in 1000s) 2625 2626 2625 2628 2623 2632 2624 2629 2624 2629 (All HHs)26265
Total no. of Recipients of CWP ('000s) 465.00 470.00 416.00 299.00 210.00 142.00 47.00 66.00 13.00 41.00 2169.00
Percent Coverage 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.08
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
57 Please see footnote 55.  
58 Please see footnote 53. 
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Table 7: Winter Fuel Payments59 
2009-10  
 
 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Disposable Income 6488 10884 13844 17080 20944 25400 30670 37481 47465 81174 29143
Number of HHs (in 1000s) 2600 2605 2610 2601 2607 2602 2611 2604 2603 2609 (All HHs)26053
Total no. of Recipients of WFP ('000s) 1274 2057.95 1853.1 2028.78 1616.34 1274.98 1122.73 807.24 728.84 573.98 13287.03
Percent Coverage 0.49 0.79 0.71 0.78 0.62 0.49 0.43 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.51
2010-11 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Disposable Income 6885 11094 14062 17656 21667 25956 31323 38224 48545 87473 30288
Number of HHs (in 1000s) 2625 2626 2625 2628 2623 2632 2624 2629 2624 2629 (All HHs)26265
Total no. of Recipients of WFP ('000s) 1470.00 1864.46 1863.75 1944.72 1678.72 1579.20 1023.36 893.86 708.48 709.83 13657.80
Percent Coverage 0.56 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.64 0.60 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.27 0.52
                                                            
59 Please see footnote 54. 
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Section 5: Results 
In section 3, we first saw that over a period of 12 years, typical domestic electricity and gas bills had 
on an average increased in real terms by 32.9% and 84%, respectively. Simultaneously, the 
percentage share of policy costs in them had increased by 14% and 4%, respectively. Even though a 
significant proportion of this rise is due to increasing wholesale price of energy, the growing share of 
policy costs in bills over time cannot be ignored. Additionally, in section 4 of the paper we looked at 
the distributional impacts of policy costs and benefits for households across different disposable 
income deciles during 2009-10.  
Figures in Table 6 suggest that in 2009-10, CWPs targeted only 10% of the households in the lowest-
income decile even though a small number of households in the highest-income decile also received 
them. Likewise, WFPs benefited 22% of the households in the highest-income decile while 51% of 
the households in the lowest-income decile did not receive any benefits. Though, the coverage of the 
scheme for households in income deciles 2, 3 and 4 was significant.  
We also notice that during 2009-10, the range of average total policy costs for a dual-fuel household 
varied from £79 in the lowest-income decile to £113 in the highest accounting for 10% and 7.4% of 
their respective energy bills. If a household, say, from the highest-income decile received a WFP 
during 2009-10, it would have benefited overall even without having received any energy-efficiency 
improving measure. On the other hand, if a household from the lowest-income decile that did not 
receive any WFP during 2009-10 but would have contributed £79 for policy costs, would be in net 
financial loss. This shows the potential overall distributional impacts of the energy-policy mix.  
The following observation from Table 2 (section 1) echoes a similar finding. During 2010-11, the 
total (nominal) policy budget was around £4276 million (column 9). We know that a sizeable 
proportion of this policy budget is recouped through higher domestic energy bills.60 Yet we also 
observe that during 2010-11, the total (nominal) budget for income supplement schemes (i.e., CWP 
and WFP) was around £3182 million. As a result, one might expect that the poorest domestic 
customers are not net adversely affected given the current policies.  
Examining this more carefully, we see that during 2010-11, the combined (nominal) budget under the 
schemes that deliver energy-efficiency measures (CERT et al., CESP, FiTs and WFS) was around 
£1552.4 million. This was less than half the total (nominal) budget under the income supplement 
schemes for that year. Moreover, of this pot of funding for energy-efficiency schemes, 76% of the 
resources were handled by energy suppliers. If it is understood that long-term solutions to fuel-
poverty can be mainly provided by improving domestic thermal efficiency then there are serious 
concerns to the amount of resources being allocated for the schemes and the ways in which they are 
collected.  
                                                            
60 Except for EU ETS, FiTs and RO policy costs that are also recouped through energy bills of the non-domestic 
sector.  
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Section 6: Conclusion  
In this research, we have tried to understand and link the information available on bill payments for 
energy-efficiency and environmental policies and energy income supplements delivered by the current 
energy-policy mix that aims to instigate ‘socially-just environmental’ improvements. The Hill’s Fuel 
Poverty Review (2012) has been instrumental in highlighting the fact that fuel poverty is a significant 
problem and is likely to remain so. With details of the Green Deal and a new ECO being finalized in 
early 2013, it is, therefore, important to improve our knowledge of the current distribution of financial 
payments and receipts related to energy policy as well as apply the lessons learnt for future decision 
making. 
We understand that there are three ways in which low-income households can be protected against 
rising energy bills; namely, improving thermal efficiency of houses, increasing household incomes 
and curbing energy prices. Policies that deliver energy-efficiency measures (such as CERT et al., 
CESP and FiTs) could result in considerable transfers between those who pay for them but do not 
receive any measures and those who actually receive them (Renewable Energy Forum Ltd., 2011). 
Due to a lack of data on the distribution of the number of policy measures delivered, it has been 
difficult to work out the extent to which financial payments and receipts related to energy policy 
directly affect low-income households. This research highlights that imperfect targeting by the current 
energy-policy mix poses a serious problem for the low-income households.  
We have seen that in terms of targeting low-income households, government-run polices (CWPs and 
WFPs) are not faring well. Moreover, with the launch of Green Deal and ECO as well as shutting 
down of WFS in the near future, reliance on energy suppliers to collect and manage such funds will 
only increase (Sunderland and Croft, 2011). The need for transparency on ways in which policy costs 
are charged is important. If policy costs are calculated on a per customer basis (as DECC and Ofgem 
assume) then there should be a greater debate on whether or not these calculations should be switched 
to a per unit basis for future schemes keeping in mind the trade-offs between equity and efficiency.  
While deliberating on system-wide impacts, it is also imperative to consider how policies affect 
incentives. For instance, figures in Table 2 suggest that in terms of funding WFPs is the largest 
scheme in the entire-policy mix. It is a universal benefit that helps those not necessarily in need. In 
principle, it is not an energy policy as the credit can be used for other consumption needs. Suggestions 
are being made to make WFPs means-tested.61 While this makes the scheme more progressive, it may 
also lead to greater administrative costs, decrease in the take-up and misalignment of household 
incentives to work and save (NAO, 2011).  
                                                            
61 Robinson, J. (2012). No more winter fuel payments for you! Government told to cut benefits for middle-class 
pensioners who don't need them, 8 June, This is Money. Available August 2012 at  
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/pensions/article-2155992/Call-cut-winter-fuel-benefits-middle-class-
pensioners.html#ixzz26NWEwLiX. Also, see Schofield et al. (2010).  
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Similarly, more thoughts should be put in making carbon price more uniform by equalising the VAT 
on energy with other goods in the economy.62 Arguments in favour of a higher VAT suggest that 
households will be more incentivised to adopt energy-efficiency measures once bills reflect the true 
social costs of energy usage. It is also the case that policy costs fall much more heavily on electricity 
than on gas customers, distorting the consumption choices between the two. It would be worth 
considering a rebalancing of policy costs between electricity and gas customers. Indeed given that 
CERT et al. primarily funds heat related domestic efficiency improvements, it is advisable to charge it 
disproportionately to gas customers. 
With high volumes of public money being spent to achieve environmental objectives, it is important 
to realise that there are still a number of ‘unknowns’ in this line of research for any definitive 
conclusions to be drawn. In the absence of relevant data, the current distributional analysis by 
disposable income deciles instead of equalized expenditure deciles may not be accurate.63 Then again, 
DECC’s evaluation of its own policies seems to have fallen far short (Renewable Energy Forum Ltd., 
2012). Without any knowledge on how energy suppliers charge policy costs to their customers, 
DECC’s assessment of future policy costs lacks empirical grounding. There is a greater call to 
understand why there are significant differences in the presentation of official statistics on energy bills 
and how can one compare between them. Ultimately, a better understanding of the distributional 
impacts of current energy policies would facilitate in developing more equitable policies in the future 
keeping in mind our environmental commitments.  
 
Acknowledgement: 
The authors wish to thank various officials from the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) and a number of energy companies for their constant support for 
this research. They also thank Irina Shaorshadze for her assistance as a part of EPRG. The financial 
support of the EPSRC Flexnet project is acknowledged. 
 
   
  
 
62 Harvey, F. (2011) Raise VAT on energy to improve efficiency, ministers told, 18 August, The Guardian. 
Available August 2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/18/raise-vat-energy-ministers. 
Also, see Bowen and Rydge (2011).  
63 For a detailed discussion on conducting distributional analysis using income versus expenditure deciles, 
please see Carrera (2010).   
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Annexes: 
A1: Information on WFS 
A1.1: Nominal Value of Traded WFS Works through CERT (2005-12)64 
Scheme Year 
Nominal Value of traded 
Warm Front works 
through CERT  
(£ million) 
2005/6 7.20 
2006/7 11.50 
2007/8 20.50 
2008/9 11.00 
2009/10 16.40 
2010/11 3.30 
2011/12 (Year to date 
April 2011 – end of 
December 2011) 
5.60 
 
Table A1.2: Annual Nominal Expenditure and Number of Households Assisted under WFS (2000-
13)65 
Scheme Year  Households assisted Budget (£ million) 
2000/1  101,000 72.00 
2001/2  303,000 197.00 
2002/3  215,000 163.00 
2003/4  167,000 164.00 
2004/5  164,000 166.00 
2005/6  165,000 192.00 
2006/7  253,079 320.00 
2007/8  268,900 350.00 
2008/9  233,594 397.00 
2009/10  212,963 369.00 
2010/11  127,930 366.00 
2011/12 N/A 143.00 
2012/13 N/A 100.00 
                                                            
64 Email correspondence with DECC. All expressed in nominal terms for each financial year.  
65 Email correspondence with DECC. All expressed in nominal terms for each financial year. 
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A2: Insights into Evaluating Percentage Shares of Policy Costs in Bills66 
 
Year Information Source 
CERT 
2000-07 Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 SDC (2008) 
2008-12 
Customer numbers                                                                         
Electricity: 26.3mil 
Gas: 22mil       
Total cost of the Original CERT from 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2011: 
£3,208 mil 
Duration of Original CERT: 3 years 
Total number of customers: 48.3 mil                              
Cost to customers: total cost / (time x total no. of customers) ~ £22. 08 
Total cost of the CERT Extension from 1 April 2011 to 31 December 
2012: £2,308 mil 
Duration of CERT Extension: 1.75 years 
Total number of customers: 48.3 mil                              
Cost to customers: total cost / (time X total no. of customers) ~ £27.30 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 
DECC (2009) and DECC (2010b) 
CESP 
2009-12 
Total costs of CESP from 1 September 2009 to 31 December 2012:           
£350 mil                                                                   
Duration of CESP: 3.33 years 
Total number of customers: 48.3 mil                                          
Cost to customers: total cost / (time X total no. of customers) ~ £2.17 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 
Available February 2012 at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/funding/funding_ops/cesp/cesp.aspx. 
 
                                                            
66 Information used in Figures 1-4 and Tables 3-5.  
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 EU ETS  
2000-07 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 SDC (2008) 
2008 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 Ofgem (2008) 
2009 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 Ofgem (2009) 
2010 
Policy cost calculated by multiplying the per unit price figure by 3.3 
MWh. Also Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from 
Appendix 5 
DECC (2010a) 
2011 
 
EU ETS impact on an average household in year 2011 = Average year 
2011 carbon price (£/tCO2) x marginal electricity emission factor67  for 
year 2011 (MtCO2/TWh) x 3.3 MWh 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 
 
Email correspondence with DECC and 
https://www.theice.com/homepage.jhtml 
 RO  
2000-07 Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 SDC (2008) 
2008 
RO impact on an average households in year Y = RO cost in year Y x 
3.3 MWh/total consumption of electricity in the economy   
Figures expressed in 2010 prices using RPI numbers from Appendix 5 
Total budget figure for calendar year Y is obtained by multiplying 1/4th the 
amount for year Y and 3/4 the amount for year Y+1 in Column [6], Table 1 
2009 
2010 
2011 
                                                            
67 For 2011, DECC assumes Marginal Emission Factor (MEF) to be around 0.4 MtCO2/TWh of net electricity supplied to the grid. This figure is based on an understanding 
that given its low prices, coal-fired power plants must be at the baseload with gas at the margin for a significant part of 2011. This assumption seems controversial for two 
reasons. Firstly, there are several techniques that can be used to calculate MEF and hence, determine the impact of a policy intervention (EU ETS in this case, Hawkes, 2010). 
It is not correct to assume that dispatch of generators follows a particular ‘merit-order’ rule. Secondly, even if we assume that gas-fired power plants are at the margin for 
2011 then according to DECC (2012a, p. 126) the average emissions factor (AEF) for a gas-fired power plant is around 0.392 MtCO2/TWh of net electricity supplied to the 
grid. This figure is calculated by using total net electricity supplied to the grid (347.506 TWh, p. 143) instead of using total final consumption of electricity (318.009 TWh, p. 
139). This would seem unfair for the households that consume 3.3 MWh of electricity on an average annually that is drawn out of final consumption (318.009 TWh) and not 
net electricity supplied to the grid (347.506 TWh). Therefore, the AEF figures given in DECC (2012a, Table 5A) should all be scaled up by a factor of 347.506/318.009.  
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  FiTs   
2010 
Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI figures from Appendix 5 DECC (2010a) 
2011 
Policy costs calculated by multiplying the per unit price figure by 3.3 
MWh. Also, Figure expressed in 2010 prices using RPI figures from 
Appendix 5 
DECC (2011b) 
 
 
1227 
A3: Information on EU ETS68 
Year 
Number of allowances for power 
stations (million) 
Price per 
allowance 
(€) 
Exchange 
rate (£/€) 
Budget   
(£ million)  
2005 172 22.3 1.4629 2621.915
2006 181 15.1 1.467 1863.054
2007 177.9 1.3 1.4619 158.1982
2008 169.2 22.41 1.2588 3012.212
2009 151.659 13.29 1.1233 1794.31
2010 156.4 14.3 1.1664 1917.455
 
 
 
  
                                                            
68 Sources:  
2010 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/GEHO1111BVEC-E-E.pdf (p. 5) 
2009 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/GEHO1010BTDK-E-E.pdf (p. 4) 
2008 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackli
ng%20climate%20change/emissions%20trading/eu_ets/publications/1_20090924140921_e_@@_euetsreport20
08.pdf (p. 11, 12)  
2007 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackli
ng%20climate%20change/emissions%20trading/eu_ets/publications/sectorlevel-ukresults-2007.pdf  
and http://www.efa2009.org/papers/SSRN-id1341638.pdf (p. 4) 
2006 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/eu_emissions_trading_scheme.aspx (p. 36) and 
http://www.efa2009.org/papers/SSRN-id1341638.pdf (p. 4) 
2005 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/eu_emissions_trading_scheme.aspx (p. 36) 
and http://www.efa2009.org/papers/SSRN-id1341638.pdf (p. 4) 
Average Euro Sterling spot exchange rate for each year is taken from Bank of England. 
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A4: RPI figures for 2000-2011 (January 1987=100)69 
 
 
Year Annual Average Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 
2000 170.3 166.6 167.5 168.4 170.1 170.7 171.1 170.5 170.5 171.7 171.6 172.1 172.2
 
2001 173.3 171.1 172 172.2 173.1 174.2 174.4 173.3 174 174.6 174.3 173.6 173.4
2002 176.2 173.3 173.8 174.5 175.7 176.2 176.2 175.9 176.4 177.6 177.9 178.2 178.5 
2003 181.3 178.4 179.3 179.9 181.2 181.5 181.3 181.3 181.6 182.5 182.6 182.7 183.5
 
2004 186.7 183.1 183.8 184.6 185.7 186.5 186.8 186.8 187.4 188.1 188.6 189 189.9
2005 192 188.9 189.6 190.5 191.6 192 192.2 192.2 192.6 193.1 193.3 193.6 194.1 
2006 198.1 193.4 194.2 195 196.5 197.7 198.5 198.5 199.2 200.1 200.4 201.1 202.7
 2007 206.6 201.6 203.1 204.4 205.4 206.2 207.3 206.1 207.3 208 208.9 209.7 210.9
2008 214.8 209.8 211.4 212.1 214 215.1 216.8 216.5 217.2 218.4 217.7 216 212.9 
2009 213.7 210.1 211.4 211.3 211.5 212.8 213.4 213.4 214.4 215.3 216 216.6 218
 2010 223.6 217.9 219.2 220.7 222.8 223.6 224.1 223.6 224.5 225.3 225.8 226.8 228.4
2011 235.2 229 231.3 232.5 234.4 235.2 235.2 234.7 236.1 237.9 238 238.5 239.4 
                                                            
69 ONS (2012a, Table 20). 
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